The Story of the Great War, Volume 5: Battle of Jutland Bank; Russian Offensive; Kut-El-Amara; East Africa; Verdun; The Great Somme Drive; United States and Belligerents; Summary of Two Years' War
History
The Story of the Great War, Volume 5: Battle of Jutland Bank; Russian Offensive; Kut-El-Amara; East Africa; Verdun; The Great Somme Drive; United States and Belligerents; Summary of Two Years' War
World War, 1914-1918
The President immediately authorized an unqualified denial to be made
that he had expressed any utterance to which such a meaning could be
attached. On the contrary, the President, in his talks with members of
Congress, had insisted that war was the last happening he wanted and
that his and not Congress' course would best insure peace. One version
of what transpired at the conference referred to by Senator Gore
credited the President with making these statements to the Senators
and Congressmen who consulted him: That the way to avoid war was to
convince the rest of the world that the people of the United States
were standing solidly behind the executive; that the course Congress
was seeking to pursue would lead toward war rather than away from it,
because yielding to Germany on the present issue would result in
further curtailments of American rights; that the only course the
United States could safely pursue now was to abide by international
law; that any other course would result in making circumstances
themselves the sole guide, and this policy would eventually cause the
fabric of international law itself to crumble and disappear; that any
concession to Germany, abridging the right of Americans to travel on
the seas, would necessitate a concession to Great Britain; and that
such a weakening of American policy would cause the country to drift
toward war. Asked what would happen if a German submarine sank an
armed merchantman with the loss of American life, the President was
quoted as intimating that in that event only a break in diplomatic
relations would follow; further asked as to the effect such a rupture
would probably have, he carefully replied that "it had been
represented that this would lead to war," and that the participation
of the United States in the European upheaval might result in ending
hostilities in six months.
The effect of the disputed disclosure of the President's views on the
issues with Germany, coupled with his disavowal of Senator Gore's
statements, was an accession of congressional support to the
Administration, and the dooming of the Gore resolution to certain
failure. After a couple of days' debate the resolution was put to the
vote and defeated March 3, 1916, by sixty-eight to fourteen. But this
only meant an overwhelming rejection of the intent of the Gore
resolution, for its proposer, foreseeing that it could not pass,
confused the President's supporters at the last minute by resorting to
a parliamentary maneuver changing its purport. The resolution, as put
before the Senate, had been reversed; instead of forbidding Americans
to travel on belligerent vessels, it had become a hypothetical
declaration of war against Germany--a bellicose affirmation in
irreconcilable contrast with the senator's well-known pacifism.
Originally the resolution read:
"Whereas a number of leading powers of the world are now engaged in a
war of unexampled proportions; and
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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