But we know that the fleet, if it is in reality badly crippled, will be under the necessity of making its way back to a base at once, and that the detour which it makes to avoid the British fleet will accordingly be as slight as possible. It certainly will not attempt to reach Helgoland by running north or east. It will doubtless start off toward the west or southwest and swing around to the south and southeast as soon as Von Scheer feels confident of having cleared the western flank of the British fleet. We may then draw two bounding lines from the point which the Germans are known to have occupied at ten o'clock, and feel reasonably sure that four o'clock will find them between these lines. In other words, Jellicoe knew with almost mathematical certainty that at four o'clock on the morning of June 1, 1916, the German fleet was within the area _A_, _B_, _C_, _D_, Plate IX. His own more powerful fleet was at _E_ and _F_, _still between the Germans and their base_, with an excess of speed of at least three knots, and probably much more than this. He searched _to the north_, and not finding them there, "was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port." He accordingly returned to port himself. THE GERMAN TACTICS [Illustration: PLATE X. Movements of Jellicoe's Forces--3:30 P.M. to 9:30 P.M. May 31st. (as shown in Jellicoe's Official Report). Note: The movements of the German Forces here shown correspond nearly, but not exactly, with the information on which plates VI and VII are based.]