Germany meditated. There was an answer to be made to Lloyd-George and President Wilson, but what? The military situation, as seen through German eyes, and the political situation in Germany, as dominated by the Junkers and annexationists, duly supplied it. Germany seemed to have become convinced that a German peace was certain. Her confidence was stated to be based on the war map, added to a belief that a lack of cohesion and community of spirit prevailed among the Allies, in contrast with her own unified will to victory, and that the United States was merely gesturing in entering the war. There was obvious camouflage in affecting to question the solidarity of the Allies and to asperse the sincerity of American intervention; but no posturing was perceived in Germany's reliance on the war map as a tangible basis for a German peace. The kaiser's new chancellor, Count von Hertling, addressing the Reichstag main committee on January 22, 1918, emphasized this reliance in a speech which constituted a tardy response to the war aims reaffirmed by Lloyd-George and President Wilson. Demanding that the Entente Powers abandon their attitude that Germany was the guilty party who must do penance and promise improvement, he said: "They may take it from me that our military position was never so favorable as it now is. Our highly gifted army leaders face the future with undiminished confidence in victory. Throughout the army, in the officers and the men, lives unbroken the joy of battle. "Our repeatedly expressed willingness for peace and the spirit of reconciliation revealed by our proposals must not be regarded by the Entente as a license permitting the indefinite lengthening of the war. "If the leaders of the enemy powers really are inclined toward peace let them revise their program once again. If they do that and come forward with fresh proposals, then we will examine them carefully." This was by way of preface to answering President Wilson's fourteen requirements if the United States was to lay down its arms. The first four, in the chancellor's view, were susceptible to agreement. Germany accepted in principle the abolition of secret diplomacy and favored open covenants of peace. The chancellor saw no difference of opinion on the subject of freedom of navigation upon the seas; but it was "highly important for the freedom of shipping in future if strongly fortified naval bases on important international routes, such as England has at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hongkong, the Falkland Islands, and many other places, were removed." Further, Germany was in accord with the President regarding the removal of economic barriers that interfered with international trade. She also affirmed that the limitation of armaments desired by President Wilson was "discussable."