This operation and the operations that preceded it in resisting the German offensives were all known to the general public as Château-Thierry, which is the name of the town lying in the lap of the hills on the bank of the Marne. No American soldiers ever fought in Château-Thierry with the exception of the machine-gun battalion of the 3d Division, which was in the town very briefly in a rear-guard action before retiring with its French associates to the other side of the Marne to prevent the Germans from crossing. In the counteroffensive it was the French who retook the town without any fighting as it was no longer defensible once the surrounding hills had been taken, and in their taking we assisted. But for all the splendid work of our divisions in the second battle of the Marne, as it is sometimes called, Château-Thierry has become the accepted name. Any one of the eight divisions engaged in the operations which began with the defense of Paris and ended with driving the Germans back to their old line was at Château-Thierry in the accepted sense of the term. General Pershing had been convinced that the Marne salient, which extended into the Allied line in an immense pocket, not only from its configuration invited attack, but that the Germans had so far extended themselves in their giant efforts that the tables could be easily turned. If he had been slow to enter his divisions into active sectors until they had been trained, he was now, in face of this opportunity, not only prepared to send in his trained divisions, but to send in divisions which had only recently arrived. By this time we were beginning to feel the accumulated results of the work of our training camps at home in forming our untrained citizens into battalions and regiments and divisions, and we were having the actual results in France of the full awakening of the American people and the Allies to the danger of defeat which the German offensives had brought, and the shipping which had been provided for at the Abbéville Conference of the Allied statesmen and commanders was rushing the men from our training camps to Europe with a speed that surpassed the transport program by two to one by midsummer. Instead of five hundred thousand in July, 1918, we had a million; and the two million would soon follow.