We now return to the Meuse-Argonne Battle, where as I have said, the issue was joined in "hammering it out on this line" tactics, and divisions which had fought with lion-hearted determination until they were staggering with exhaustion and their ranks depleted by casualties, were withdrawn in order that fresh divisions might take their place. Some divisions either for one reason or another were able to remain in longer than others. The harder a division's experience the more it suffered from what is known as "dispersion"; its units, either in their continued advances or in resisting attacks and counterattacks in the midst of continued shell fire, lost their cohesion. How they kept cohesion even for a day was a marvel past understanding. A division which had only a portion of its troops at a time in the front line could last longer than a division that had put all its reserves into action and had worn out the personnel of the whole division. Much depended upon the division commander and his staff. If he were capable and his division well-trained, he could accomplish results through prompt tactical adaptability to the situation on his front without unnecessary sacrifice of his men. In holding ground against machine-gun fire the fewer men on the front the better. The object was always to gain, of course, the maximum of advantage at the minimum of cost. When our lines settled down in a position it was not to intrench according to the old system, but simply to bide their time for another attack. There was no thought but the offensive. The days of trench warfare were entirely over. The contact with the enemy was through outpost lines in fox holes and machine-gun positions chosen carefully with a view to interlocking fire that covered every possible path or avenue of approach. With the Germans bringing up fresh artillery and countless machine guns in full realization of the situation it became evident that further advance by piecemeal was impracticable and that another general attack should be made along the old battle front. Across the Meuse River on our right flank were a series of heights ideal for artillery positions, overlooking not only the valley, but all the ravines, the roads, and open places. Thus our 3d Corps, swinging toward the whaleback, was literally in a trough of fire from the heights of the whaleback in front and in flank and from the heights across the Meuse in flank. On our left flank our 1st Corps was in the same hateful position as our 3d on our right. The 28th Division was fighting against the wooded escarpments which extended from the bastion of the Argonne Forest into the river valley. In the forest itself, the 77th was meeting with stubborn resistance in the thick underbrush, and the French army on its left was as unable as the 28th Division on its right to relieve its situation.