Machine-gun positions, defended localities, and certain portions of trenches were stored with several days' supply of ammunition, food, and water for the use of the garrisons. The front held remained comparatively quiet during January, 1918, and, except for minor patrolling encounters and occasional shoots, nothing beyond the usual activity ever prevailing on a front held by this corps occurred. In the months of February and March, 1918, little or no work was being done by the enemy on his actual defenses, but roads and disused trench railways were being repaired. In the rear areas his ammunition and engineer supply dumps were increasing in number and in size, while fresh battery positions were appearing almost daily. Furthermore, hostile aircraft and anti-aircraft guns were very active in preventing reconnoissance by British aeroplanes. Early in March, 1918, it was considered that the enemy's front was ready for offensive operations. No concentration of troops had been observed, but the numerous towns and villages in close proximity to the front provided extensive accommodation and made it possible for him to conceal such concentrations. Conditions so favorable to the Germans required relentless vigilance on the part of the Corps Intelligence Organization, as the Canadians were dependent on the efficiency of this branch of the service for timely warning against surprise attacks. In addition to the preparation above mentioned the enemy assumed early in February, 1918, a very aggressive attitude, raiding the Canadian lines very frequently, using for the purpose specially trained storm troops. His destructive shoots and intense gas shelling were also of frequent occurrence. To quell this activity, numerous counter-raids, retaliation shoots, and gas projections were carried out, and especially in the Lens sector soon had the desired effect. Prisoners captured in Canadian raids stated that all their divisions had been brought up to strength and were undergoing hard training in the tactics of semiopen warfare. They stated, or left it to be understood, that the forthcoming German attacks were based on a very deep initial penetration and the rapid exploitation of success. No indications were given as to the points at which attacks would be launched, but they stated that every one of their sectors was prepared and practically ready. It was also definitely established that the enemy reserve divisions were kept near railways, ready to be moved quickly to the parts of the front selected for the coming drive. CHAPTER XVI HOLDING LENS AND ARRAS