"The moral effect of the most bitter and relentless fighting which led to the capture of Cambrai was tremendous. The Germans had at last learned and understood that they were beaten." The Canadian Corps, on the right of the First Army, was to attack eastward astride the Arras-Cambrai road, and by forcing its way through the Drocourt-Queant line south of the Scarpe to break the hinge of the Hindenburg system and prevent the possibility of the enemy rallying behind this powerfully organized defended area. The ground to be attacked lent itself peculiarly to defense, being composed of a succession of ridges, rivers, and canals, which formed natural lines of defense of very great strength. These natural positions, often mutually supporting, had been abundantly fortified. Their organization was the last work in military engineering, and represented years of intensive and systematic labor. Barbed-wire entanglements were formidable, machine-gun positions innumerable, and large tunnels had been provided for the protection of the garrison. The four main system of defense consisted of the following lines: The old German front system east of Monchy-le-Preux, the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, the Drocourt-Queant line, and the Canal du Nord line. These, with their subsidiary switches and strong points, as well as the less organized, but by no means weak intermediate lines of trenches, made the series of positions to be attacked without doubt one of the strongest defensively on the western front. Broad glacis, studded with machine-gun nests, defended the immediate approaches to these lines, and this necessitated in each case heavy fighting to gain a suitable jumping-off line before assaulting the main position. In addition to these systems, and as a preliminary to the attack on the old German system east of Monchy-le-Preux, it was necessary to capture the very well organized British defenses which had been lost in the fighting of March, 1918. These defenses were intact to a depth of about 5,500 yards, and were dominated by the heights of Monchy-le-Preux, from which the Germans were enjoying superior observation. Throughout these operations there could not be any element of surprise, other than that afforded by the selection of the actual hour of the assaults. The positions to be attacked formed the pivot of the movements of the German army to the south, and the security of the armies to the north depended also on these positions being retained. There was consequently little doubt that the enemy was alert, and had made every disposition to repulse the expected attacks. Therefore, the plans necessitated provision for very hard and continuous fighting, the main stress being laid on the continuity of the operations.