In these conferences it was expected that Ukraine would take over the nine provinces that comprised the country and with this in view the Council drew up a Statute or Constitution for the governing of the country. They added to the Council representatives of the various minorities in Ukraine and then sent the document to the Provisional Government. Here it was badly received and when the conservative members returned to the cabinet, they sent a series of Instructions to the Council which cut Ukraine in half and worked to hamper its activities. The continuation of these tactics brought no profit to either the Ukrainian Central Council or the Provisional Government. They served only to weaken and embarrass the former and brought no benefit to the latter, for during July the Provisional Government was faced by a revolt of the Bolsheviks under Lenin in Petrograd. Although this was suppressed, it had its own not inconsiderable part in the general breakdown of administration. The six months between the Revolution and the accession to power of the Bolsheviks was a confused and confusing period. On the one hand the steadily weakening power of the Provisional Government was carrying down with it the old Russia, but the leaders declined to see this and loved to imagine that the new ideals of democracy would ultimately straighten out all the difficulties. The Central Council was endeavoring to go along with the Provisional Government and at the same time to secure the rights of Ukraine. Along with this, there was a vast majority of the peasants who were far more concerned with the solution of the agrarian problem than they were in matters of general policy and they envisaged freedom as meaning that there would be no government of any kind, no taxes, and no formal organization. This dubious situation could not continue indefinitely. Sooner or later one side or the other would have to yield and the Council was only weakening its own position and dignity by continuing negotiations. Yet no one wanted to take the initiative in any decisive action. The situation was not made any better by the actions of the foreign representatives in Petrograd. They too were unable to make up their own minds. On the one hand, they felt very strongly that they had an obligation to the Provisional Government because of the sacrifices that Russia had made in the common war. On the other, they were themselves sending representatives to be present in Kiev and the other national states but they refused to express themselves definitely as to what they desired to see set up on the ruins of the Empire. Under these circumstances it was difficult for the young governments to know on what diplomatic support they could rely or what policy would be most effective and practical.