On the other hand, the victorious Allies could not forget the sacrifices that had been made by the Russian Empire during the early years of the War and they persisted in believing that once Bolshevism was overthrown, all of these new nations would be only too willing to join in a new, free, and democratic Russia. They hated to do anything that would create a permanent situation. They were equally opposed to the efforts of the White Russian armies to form a definite conservative government which might be denounced as reactionary and aiming to restore the old Russian monarchy. Thus the policy of the Allies toward Russia remained in a dangerous position which could only in the long run strengthen the power of the Bolsheviks, the only group which was not affected by the desires of the Allies and which understood the general weakness of the entire Allied policy. As a result there was made almost no mention of Russia in any of the treaties that came out of the Paris Peace Conference, for it was intended that the matter should be reconsidered, when, as, and if Russia expelled the Bolsheviks and proceeded to hold democratic and free elections. This brought about the impossible situation that the Congress could seriously consider regulations as to the position of Eastern Galicia (Western Ukraine) toward Poland, since the area had been under Austria-Hungary, but could not and would not take action in regard to that part of Ukraine which had been under Russian rule prior to 1914. The Poles utilized the situation to extend their claims over Western Ukraine and they obstinately refused to consider any settlement which would establish a political boundary between Poland and Western Ukraine, no matter how the case was put forward. Step by step the Allies moderated their demands, especially since France insisted stubbornly on backing almost all of the Polish claims. Thus on June 25, the Allied Supreme Council allowed Poland to occupy the territory up to the Zbruch River with a proviso that the Poles should guarantee local autonomy and freedom of religion to the non-Polish population. A little later they again offered to give Poland a twenty-five-year mandate over Eastern Galicia and to grant a plebiscite at the end of that time. Then, later in the year, they developed the idea of the Curzon line to mark the eastern boundary of the country, but there was also the supplementary idea that if Poland occupied land beyond this, she might receive it when the future of Russia was settled. In view of the weak Polish organization, which was only struggling to its feet and was short of all supplies, this idea that the Poles should organize a section of Russia by their own efforts could only increase the Polish claims. It is therefore not surprising in view of the entire tangle that the Peace Treaties provided no definite eastern boundary for Poland and in fact do not mention one in the official texts of the documents.