"The object of my present motion, then, my Lord, is to compel the Attorney-General to do that duty which he has so long neglected when his own friends were concerned; and as I think his present proceedings against me are both partial and unjust, I shall press the criminal prosecution of his friends, Henry John Boulton Esquire, for murder, and Samuel P. Jarvis and others for riot. In the latter case, please your Lordship, the rioters were sued in a civil action, and damages to a considerable amount recovered from them; yet I feel it my duty to press the criminal prosecution, because James Fitz Gibbon Esquire, a magistrate of this District, begged the amount of the fine from door to door in this town, and the rioters have so far gone wholly unpunished. All I ask, please your Lordship, is justice and impartiality, and from your Lordship's character I doubt not I shall receive them at your hands." After a moment's consideration, during which silence reigned supreme in the Court-room, Judge Willis remarked:--"If the Attorney-General has acted as you say, he has very much neglected his duty. Go you before the Grand Jury, and if you meet with any obstruction or difficulty I will see that the Attorney-General affords you every facility." This was, beyond doubt, very unbecoming language to be used by a Judge under such circumstances. It must be understood that Judge Willis had not properly before him any facts upon which to base his opinion as to the Attorney-General's having neglected his duty. That that official had much to answer for; that his practice had been one-sided and inconsistent; that much of his life had been spent in endeavouring to smother public opinion and to maintain the supremacy of a selfish and corrupt caste--this must be conceded at the bar of history. But no such allegations were before Judge Willis in an official form, and he had no right to assume anything against the Attorney-General in the absence of the most irrefragable evidence. Instead of evidence, he had merely heard the _ex parte_ statements of an alleged libeller. This was the legal aspect of the matter, and it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Judge permitted himself to be influenced, by his personal dislike to Attorney-General Robinson.