The unseemliness of thus discussing, in open Court, how far the Attorney-General had proved to be an effective public servant, must be apparent to everybody. And it must be admitted that the discussion was provoked by Justice Willis, who had made something very like an attack upon the Attorney-General--an attack based upon the unsworn statements of an indicted libeller. He had moreover permitted Collins to go a most unwarrantable length in his onslaught upon the Crown prosecutor, more especially as no affidavits had been produced in support of the motion. A layman who comes before the Courts _inops consilii_ is allowed more latitude in the conduct of his case than is generally conceded to a counsel whose professional business it is to plead at the bar; but the latitude permitted in the case under consideration was beyond all legitimate bounds. The Judge's dislike to the Attorney-General seems to have predisposed him to believe that all Collins's allegations were true. In reality they were exaggerated presentations of notorious facts. That they were largely founded upon facts Judge Willis probably knew from common hearsay. But while sitting on the bench he had nothing to do with common hearsay. _A fortiori_, he was not justified, upon the mere assumption of a hypothetical case,[102] in admonishing the Attorney-General in the presence of his accuser, and in humiliating him in the presence of the bar of which he was the rightful head. An English judge would be considered as departing widely beyond the sphere of his duty if he were thus openly to arraign the conduct of the Attorney-General, especially in a matter clearly lying, as in the case under consideration, within that officer's discretion. English judges, on the contrary, are much more likely to interpose on behalf of the officers of the Crown, and to prevent their acts and motives from being called in question in open Court by persons against whom proceedings have been instituted by them. Judge Willis seems to have been wrong in his law, wrong in his etiquette, wrong in his temper, and wrong in his construction of judicial amenities.