Having arrived at such a decision as to the constitution of the Court, and having apprised the Colonial Secretary thereof, he took the earliest feasible opportunity of making it known to the Provincial bar. At ten o'clock in the forenoon of the opening day of Trinity Term--which was Monday, the 16th of June--he repaired to the Court House at York. While robing himself in the Judge's chamber he was joined by his colleague, Justice Sherwood, and a few moments afterward they both proceeded to the Court room, attended by the Sheriff in the usual manner. The Court having been formally opened, Judge Willis arose and addressed the audience, standing all the while, after the manner of a counsel at the bar. In the course of his remarks, which occupied nearly an hour in delivery, he expressed himself in very positive terms as to the constitution of the Court. He declared it to be his decided opinion that the Court could not be legally held without the presence of the Chief Justice and two puisne Judges; that everything which had theretofore been done in the Court by two Judges only was null and void; that the Lieutenant-Governor had no authority to grant leave of absence to a Judge without the express approbation of the Executive Council; that he (Judge Willis) had made enquiry at the office of the Executive Council, and had found that leave had always been granted by the Lieutenant-Governor alone, in pursuance of which leave Chief Justice Campbell was now absent from the Province. The manner in which the leave of absence to the Chief Justice, as well as to many other persons holding situations under the Provincial Government, had been granted by the Lieutenant-Governor, was pronounced to be, in Judge Willis's opinion, not only irregular but illegal, whereby the incumbents had forfeited their several offices. During the preceding Term an order of the Court had been passed by Judge Sherwood and himself. That order he now rescinded, so far as his authority was concerned, and he expressed his regret that he had entered upon the discharge of his judicial functions without having previously acquainted himself with the state of the law. He added that he had felt it to be his imperative duty to declare his opinion as to the incapacity of the Court to legally proceed with the business before it; and that, holding that opinion, he had resolved to decline to sit any longer upon the bench, though he would remain at hand to attend to any functions which he could legally discharge.