The day after the battle of Ulundi, and before the victory was known to the troops of the 1st Division, about 700 Zulus, with all their cattle, women, and children, came into the camp at Richard's Cove, near Port Durnford, to tender submission and to claim protection. There is not the slightest doubt but that they had heard of the battle, although there was not a whisper of the engagement heard amongst these people. General Crealock, to give importance to the ceremony, ordered a general parade of the division at midday, and it was impossible not to be struck with the attenuated condition of his battalions, although every available man was put on parade. Both brigades made up rather a weak division. The 1st Brigade was made up of the Buffs, two companies of the 88th, two companies of the "Shah's" and "Active's" bluejackets, and one of the marine artillery; while the 2nd Brigade was composed of the Royal Artillery, 57th, 60th Rifles, and 91st--in all twenty companies. At half past twelve the General, surrounded by his staff, rode on to the ground, and the division was wheeled into line. Then a galloper was sent out to the Zulus who were halted on the crest of the neighbouring hills, and they were told to advance and lay down their arms. Three hundred fine-looking fellows then advanced in good order, and arriving at the prescribed distance, made the customary obeisance while they deposited assegais and guns, in number about seventy, fire-arms mostly of the old pattern. However, time proved that the results of Lord Chelmsford's engagement and victory on the 4th (July) were of far greater importance than had been at first imagined. Chiefs and tribes came pouring into the various camps, not by dozens or by scores, but literally by hundreds, and the only two questions they asked--and these kept invariably recurring--were "Why was not the victory of Ulundi followed up vigorously? and why was Cetywayo allowed to escape?" It was this great error of immediately retiring from Ulundi which made us again ridiculous, not only in the eyes of Zululand, but also in those of military Europe. It was due, not to Lord Chelmsford, nor those under his command, but to extraneous influences beyond his control; and public opinion never arrived at a more true or just conclusion than in saying that the arrival of Lord Chelmsford's successor, no matter how valuable or how necessary it might have been, came at a most inopportune time, for it was well known that Lord Chelmsford's plans were so perfectly matured, that had he been left free to carry out his own designs, instead of being hampered and constrained by the orders of the new Commander-in-chief, he would have followed up Ulundi with the utmost possible activity, and would in all probability have secured the person of the king. Terms for the final pacification of the whole of Zululand could then have been dictated on the spot, and there would have been an end to the entire business.