The more far-seeing men in the United States were uneasy about the movement for mutual preferential tariffs in the British Empire. They saw at once that if successful it would consolidate and strengthen British power and wealth and would be a severe blow to the prosperity of the United States, which for fifty years had been fattening upon the free British markets, while for thirty years their own had been to a great extent closed to the foreigner and preserved for their own enrichment. I felt that the failure of the Conference would give power to our enemies in the United States and aid them to enmesh us in the trade entanglements which would preclude the possibility of our succeeding in carrying our policy into effect. Every week I became more and more alarmed. It will be remembered that there was then no Tariff Reform movement in England. That Lord Salisbury was dying, that Mr. Chamberlain had not yet openly committed himself, and that nothing was being done, while our opponents were actively at work both in the States and in Canada. The small faction in Canada who were disloyal were once more taking heart while the loyal element were discouraged. Still further to cause anxiety the Imperial Federation Defence Committee took this opportunity, through Mr. Arthur Loring, to make an imperious demand upon the Colonies to hand over at once large cash contributions in support of the Navy, or practically to cut us adrift. Had the desire been to smash up the Empire, the attack could not have been better timed than when everything was going against the Imperial view. I wrote a reply which appeared in _The Times_ on the 2nd March, 1903: SIR, With reference to your issues of January 9th and 10th which contained the letter of Mr. Arthur Loring, Hon. Secretary of the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee, and your leading article upon the question of colonial contributions to the Imperial Navy, I desire to send a reply from the Canadian point of view.