When we were within about eight miles of Springfield Gen. Curtis decided to put his troops in line of battle for the advance on the town, and directed me to stretch out my supply train in a long line of battle, so that in falling back, in case the troops were repulsed, he could rally the men on the wagons. I did not like the tactics, but, of course, obeyed the order. The line moved on to Springfield, and took the town without resistance, the enemy having fled southward, in the direction of Pea Ridge, the preceding day. Of course, our success relieved my anxiety about the wagons; but fancy has often pictured since the stampede of six-mule teams that, had we met with any reverse, would have taken place over the prairies of southwest Missouri. It was felt almost certain that Price had only abandoned Springfield in order to offer battle more advantageously in the rough hills south of the town where Wilson's Creek had been fought. The spirit of the army was up, and it moved promptly forward to engage him in his chosen fastness. The Secessionist historians and the admirers of Price, Marmaduke, Shelby and others give thrillingly sanguinary stories of the fierce resistance offered in the defiles and passes through the foothills of the Ozarks, but these statements are not supported by either the official reports or the regimental histories of the Union army. These all concur in the statement that while there was a great deal of noisy cannonading, Price's troops yielded ground quite easily, and all were surprised that no more effective resistance was made at places that offered such wonderful opportunities for defense. 307 In his report to Gov. Jackson Gen. Price gives this succinct statement of his share in the movement: