Gen. Sigel pursued the central portion through Keetsville, seven miles
to the north, capturing nearly 200 prisoners and a great quantity of
arms and stores. He believed Curtis would retreat, and was well on his
way to Springfield when ordered back by Curtis to make his camp on the
battlefield with the rest. Gen. Curtis officially reported his loss as
follows:
335
UNION LOSSES.
Command.
Killed.
Wounded
It will be noticed by the above figures that Davis's Division lost
four officers and 42 men killed, 18 officers and 256 men wounded, while
Sigel's two divisions lost only three officers and 28 men killed, seven
officers and 149 men wounded.
The heaviest loss fell upon the 9th Iowa, which had 39 killed, 176
wounded and four missing. The next heaviest was upon the 4th Iowa, which
had 18 killed, 139 wounded and three missing.
Gen. Van Dorn estimated his loss at 1,000 killed and wounded and 300
missing. This is known to be inaccurate, because more Confederate than
Union dead were buried on the battlefield, and Gen. Curtis sent 500
prisoners to the rear.
The question naturally occurs: Why did Van Dorn relinquish such a
supreme effort with such a small loss?
336
Our amusing acquaintance, Gen. Pike, does not conceal the fact that he
and those around him were very badly whipped. After joining Van Dorn
he resumed his old habit of standing around "observing the enemy." He
reports that he did this for two hours at a stretch when Curtis was
delivering the final crushing blows upon Van Dorn. He then moved
with much promptness toward the rear, for an officer came up with the
stunning intelligence, "You are not safe here, for the enemy's
cavalry are within 150 yards of you." This seemed to have escaped his
"observation" up to that time. He rode on, and his pace was accelerated
by hearing another officer cry out "Close up; close up; or you will all
be cut to pieces."
He halted presently, but had to start again, for a shell was sent by the
enemy up the road from the point of the hill around which he had just
passed. The cry of "The cavalry are coming was raised, and everything
became confusion." He escaped the "enemy's cavalry by rapid riding,"
but was unable to get ahead of his fastgoing troops and stop them,
until they reached Elm Spring, many miles away. He came to this sage
conclusion:
The enemy, I learn, had been encamped at Pea Vine Ridge for
three weeks, and Sigel's advance was but a ruse to induce
our forces to march northward and give them battle in
positions selected by themselves.
There were others who shared his feelings; for he says:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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