When we have a set of writings before us and endeavour to estimate the amount of credulity and superstition to which their authors were a prey, the only legitimate mode of proceeding is to subject these writings to a thorough and minute examination as to the indications of credulity and superstition contained in them. Having done this, it then becomes our duty to ascertain the amount of general good sense or the want of it which is displayed by them in these or in other subjects, and then to form a general conclusion by fairly balancing the indications of credulity and good sense against each other. The author, however, seems not to have had the smallest idea that it is the duty of the critic to ascertain what are the facts of the case as presented by the writings, and to form a general conclusion by a careful review of the entire evidence. On the contrary, his mode of reasoning is to quote a number of opinions held by various writers, widely separated from each other in time, to charge them on the contemporaries of our Lord, and refer to nearly every passage in the New Testament which has even the remotest bearing on the subject, for the purpose of fastening these superstitions on the followers of Jesus. Such a mode of reasoning can only avail to establish a foregone conclusion. Again: In forming a judgment on such a subject, it also behoves us most carefully to consider whether the subject‐matter of the writings is or is not of such a character, that if their authors had been addicted to such gross superstitions, there would not of necessity have been frequent examples of them in their pages? Also whether the absence of such references, when the subject on which they were writing was certain to have suggested them to their minds, does not constitute a strong proof that these superstitions were not held by them? In one word, it is absurd to attempt to charge writers with boundless credulity and superstition, on the ground that a multitude of grotesque beliefs were prevalent in their day. No author can be held responsible for beliefs other than those which appear in his pages, especially when subject‐matter of his writings would have been certain to call them into activity if he had entertained them.