Let me again draw attention to the fact that the only correct conception of a miracle in connection with this controversy, is that of an event wrought in external nature with a definite moral aim and purpose. Extraordinary events, to which no such moral aim and purpose can be assigned, may be unusual occurrences, but are in no proper sense of the words evidential miracles. An isolated occurrence of an extraordinary nature, and an event marked with a definite moral purpose, are two wholly different things. The one may be credible, and the other wholly incredible. We habitually recognise the distinction in ordinary life, and it entirely affects our judgment of the probability of an event. We esteem the action of a particular person quite credible under one set of circumstances, which we should reject as incredible under another. Thus if we were informed that a friend with whom we were intimately acquainted, had precipitated himself from a height into the water, supposing him to be sane, we should not believe it. But if we received the information that he had done it to save a person from drowning, and we knew that he was a man of courage, we should accept the fact without the smallest hesitation. On this account, therefore, the moral aspect of the alleged miracle is of the utmost importance; and it is necessary for its correct conception that it should not only be an extraordinary occurrence in external nature, but that it should take place at the bidding of another, and in order to render it credible, that it should be calculated to effectuate some definite moral purpose. Alleged supernatural events, which are destitute of these accompaniments, are always liable to a very high degree of _à priori_ suspicion. In fact it would be difficult to prove them to be supernatural. All that could be affirmed respecting them would be that they were very unusual occurrences, which it was impossible to account for by the action of any known force. If the universe is under the government of God, all supernatural action must either be the result of His agency or permission. If He interferes with the order of occurrences, it is evident that such interference cannot be capricious, but must have a definite purpose. We are justified, therefore, in refusing to accept occurrences as supernatural, which are destitute of all appearance of purpose in their performance.