2. The whole range of ancient supernaturalism is in contradiction to everything which we can conceive of the moral character of God. Let us take as an illustration the phenomena of Soothsaying. Who can believe that God employed the entrails of slaughtered beasts as the means of revealing the future? or that it was consistent with his character to manifest his will through a multitude of monstrous portents? There is perhaps not a single occurrence of ancient supernaturalism which does not offend against our primary conception of the Divine character; and, therefore, the whole is worthy of summary rejection. 3. Ancient supernaturalism assigned its occurrences to no cause adequate to produce them. Those who asserted its reality, referred it to the action of deities who possessed very limited power, or to occult powers in nature. Such occult powers we now know to have no existence, and the power attributed to the supposed deities was far too limited to be capable of producing the results in question. All reputed events, the alleged cause of which is unable to produce them, we are entitled to reject without further investigation. 4. A large amount of ancient supernaturalism rested on no evidence whatever. Of those portions for which any reasons were alleged, the evidence itself was of a character exactly suited to discredit it. Of this kind was the whole of the supernaturalism connected with the state religions. These were in the hands of men who used them for the purpose of acting on the vulgar, and who therefore readily accepted the report of anything, however incredible, which could subserve their end. Other portions were palpable impostures worked for the basest and most selfish purposes. A very brief acquaintance with the nature of the evidence on which it rests is sufficient to justify us in rejecting it without entering on any inquiry as to its details. Such being the general character of ancient supernaturalism, it is absurd to argue that its existence is a reason for rejecting along with it another order of supernaturalism, which stands contrasted with it in every particular. We might as well urge the existence of a vast number of counterfeits as a reason for rejecting everything which is genuine. We do not reject it because it is supernatural, but because it is utterly incredible. A statement of a few particulars will exhibit the contrast between it and the supernaturalism of the New Testament in a striking point of view. 1. Christian supernaturalism alleges that its occurrences are the result of the action of a force which, if present, is certainly adequate to produce them. Ancient supernaturalism alleges no cause whatever, or one wholly inadequate. 2. Christian supernaturalism alleges a perfectly adequate purpose for its production; that purpose being the attestation of the divine mission of Jesus. Ancient supernaturalism alleges either no purpose at all, or a degraded one.