The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical: Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine RevelationRow, C. A. (Charles Adolphus)
Religion
The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical: Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine Revelation
Row, C. A. (Charles Adolphus)
Bible. New Testament -- Evidences, authority, etc.; Miracles; Revelation; Supernatural in the Bible
Nor is the case altogether different with regard to pantheism. According
to this system, God is only another name for nature, which works out every
form of fleeting existence for itself in an unceasing round of unconscious
self‐evolution. The essence of its affirmation is, that God has no
conscious personal existence, but that He is only another name for the
blind unconscious forces of the universe. Such a being (if it is possible
to conceive of it as a being at all, or as a unity) is everlastingly
making a revelation of itself by a ceaseless evolution of phenomena, the
result of the blind action of its inherent forces. But to whom? Obviously
only to beings capable of reason and consciousness, whom it (I dare not
say, He) has evolved out of its own bosom, and will again resolve into
unconsciousness. Prior to their evolution this mighty τὸ πᾶν must have
been everlastingly making manifestations of itself, without a single being
in existence capable of recognizing them. Whatever be the result of such
theories in a logical point of view, it is evident that if pantheism be a
rational account of the order of the universe, a revelation and miracles,
in any sense in which such terms can bear meaning, are impossible.
No less applicable is the same remark to that form of pantheism held by
Mr. Herbert Spencer, which, while it affirms the existence of a cause of
all things, as alike required by the demands of philosophy, science, and
religion, yet affirms that He is unknown and unknowable, and that every
thing which is knowable, although a manifestation of that great unknown
cause, yet conveys no idea of Him that the intellect can apprehend. In one
word, the unknown cause of all things is inconceivable, and incapable of
becoming the subject of rational thought. The intellect cannot help
assuming the existence of this cause of all things; but all that it can
affirm of him is, that He is unknown and unknowable; and that everything
within the bounds of our knowledge, though it may represent some mode of
his existence, cannot be he, or like him. With respect to this theory,
while it cleverly evades some of the harsher difficulties of pantheism and
atheism, it is not too much to say that it is a civil way of bowing God
out of the universe, of which He is alleged to be the cause. He can
neither be a person, nor have wisdom, nor be benevolent, nor be capable of
conscious self‐manifestation; because all these conceptions are limited
and finite. All that we can know of Him is, that such a cause exists
beyond present phenomena; and that we are condemned respecting Him, to a
profound and perpetual ignorance. It is possible to designate such a being
by the name of God, but it would be to use the term in a sense peculiar to
those who thus employ it. Such a God is a bare abstract conception of the
intellect, void of all moral value. It is sufficient for my present
purpose to observe that it is impossible for the unknown and the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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