The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical: Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine RevelationRow, C. A. (Charles Adolphus)
Religion
The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical: Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine Revelation
Row, C. A. (Charles Adolphus)
Bible. New Testament -- Evidences, authority, etc.; Miracles; Revelation; Supernatural in the Bible
The work of Dr. Mansel may be described as an attempt to prove the truth
of Christianity on the principles of the most sceptical philosophy. It may
be briefly stated thus: Reason is incapable of forming any idea of God as
He is, whether as the Infinite, the Absolute, or the first Cause. All the
conceptions which we can frame on the subject are mutually self‐
destructive. On similar principles our conceptions of His moral attributes
are wholly inadequate to inform us of His real perfections. It by no means
follows that our human conception of benevolence or justice is a measure
of the divine benevolence, or of divine justice; and so of His other
attributes. It is affirmed that because they are the attributes of an
infinite Being, they lie beyond the possibility of being realized in human
thought. Consequently, holiness in God may admit of very different
manifestations from holiness in man. Upon these principles, which affirm
the inadequacy of the human intellect, even to conceive of anything as it
exists in God, it follows that our only possible conceptions of God are
relative; or, to use the word chosen by the author in relation to
Christianity, regulative; _i.e._ fitted to regulate our conduct, but not
to illuminate our understanding.
Upon the assumption that reason, when it attempts to analyse our ideas of
the Infinite, the Absolute, or the first Cause, lands us in hopeless
contradictions, Dr. Mansel arrives at the conclusion that it is incapable
of forming any conception of God as he actually exists. It follows as a
necessary consequence from this, that even by revelation we are only
capable of attaining relative ideas of Him, and that these relative ideas
do not represent His real nature, but are only regulative of conduct,
_i.e._ we are to act upon them as if they were true. _E.g._ God is
revealed as holy. Our only conception of holiness is our human conception
of it. But we cannot know that this is an adequate measure of the divine
holiness. God is declared to be benevolent. We have no conception of
benevolence but that which is derived from the human mind. So likewise
with respect to justice. But benevolence and justice as they exist in God
may differ from these qualities as they exist in man. The same thing
follows as a necessary conclusion from Dr. Mansel’s premises with respect
to all the other attributes of God. Nothing will better illustrate the
position to which this argument reduces us than to apply it to the
truthfulness or veracity of God. All that we know about truthfulness is as
it exists in finite beings, that is, in men. But God is an infinite being.
It follows therefore that truthfulness in man is no adequate
representation of truthfulness as it exists in God, that is to say, that
the divine veracity may differ from our human conception of it. This is
certainly a very startling position.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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