The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical: Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine RevelationRow, C. A. (Charles Adolphus)
Religion
The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical: Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine Revelation
Row, C. A. (Charles Adolphus)
Bible. New Testament -- Evidences, authority, etc.; Miracles; Revelation; Supernatural in the Bible
First, I observe that a miracle cannot be pronounced incredible, on the
ground that it is an effect without an adequate cause. On this point I may
refer to the high authority of Mr. Mill, that the idea of a miracle
contradicts no law of causation. “In order,” says he, “that any alleged
fact should be contradictory to a law of causation, the allegation must be
not simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect,
for that would be no uncommon occurrence, but that this happened in the
absence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now in the case of an alleged
miracle the objection is the very opposite of this. It is that the effect
was defeated, not in the absence, but in consequence, of a counteracting
cause, viz., a direct interposition of an act of will of some being who
has power over nature; and in particular of a being whose will being
assumed to have induced all the causes, with the powers by which they
produce their effects, may well be supposed able to counteract them.”
(_Logic_, vol. ii. p. 167.)
A miracle therefore may not be the result of the action of any force which
falls within the range of our knowledge. It may be necessary for its
performance to neutralize the action of all existing forces by the calling
into energy of more powerful ones. But their operation need not even be
suspended. An adequate force, or power, or cause (it matters not by what
name we call it) is present to effectuate the result; viz. the power which
rules the universe, _i.e._ God. As Mr. Mill justly observes, the only
question which can be raised if the existence of God is assumed, is, not
the want of the presence of an adequate cause, for the supposition pre‐
supposes the presence of one, but the want of will on the part of God to
bring about the result. Thus it may be fairly argued that God will not
work a miracle, from the fact that He has not done so in the course of
previous observation.
It has been frequently affirmed that a miracle is an act which is contrary
to the laws of nature, or a violation of them, or a suspension of them, or
a violation of the order of nature; and that its occurrence is therefore
incredible, as being contrary to reason. A miracle need involve neither of
these. The laws of nature as conceived by physical science are a set of
antecedents followed by a set of invariable consequents. A miracle does
not interfere with this. Its very conception involves a new antecedent
followed by its consequent. The utmost that can be urged is that we have
never before witnessed the presence of that particular antecedent and
consequent, or that the antecedents which we have witnessed have been
followed by totally different consequents. The only mode in which such a
law could be violated would be, if a particular antecedent was present and
no other capable of modifying its action, and it failed to be attended
with its proper consequent. But this is not involved in the conception of
a miracle.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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