action of this to any known law of invariable sequence. It follows therefore that man is a power either in or out of nature, which is capable of interfering with the order of the results of its material forces, or, in the language of those with whom I am reasoning, of violating the order of nature. But it will be further objected that man in his action on nature can only use or combine such natural forces as come within his knowledge; and this proves nothing about the possibility of the action of a power outside nature which is able to employ its known and unknown forces for the purpose of producing such results as miracles. I answer that this objection can have no validity unless it is first assumed that man is a portion of nature in the sense in which we are now speaking of it. But the proof of this has certainly yet to be given. By the word “nature,” as it is used by this philosophy, is meant the sum total of known material forces, acting on matter in conformity with invariable laws; that is to say, of forces which are devoid of intelligence and volition. It is impossible in this sense of the word to include man in it, until his entire intellectual and moral being can be shown to be the result of material forces. Nor even if this could be done, would it avail for the present argument; for however it may have originated, man’s power to modify the action of material forces is an existing fact, and produces results quite different in kind from the action of the unintelligent forces of nature.