The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis: A History with DocumentsNordlund, Karl
History
The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis: A History with Documents
Nordlund, Karl
Norway -- Politics and government -- 1814-1905; Sweden - -Politics and government -- 1814-1905
Thereupon the Section of the Cabinet Council made the strongest
representations in reference to His Majesty's decision, which would rouse
complaints in Norway, where they had hoped that the persistent and loyal
efforts to solve the problem through negotiations with Sweden, would have
led to happy results in reference to the rights and claims of the
Kingdom. In this case Norway's interests in the Union were equal with
those of Sweden. For that Norway's rights were respected, was a necessary
condition for a safe guarantee of the Union. A resolution after His
Majesty's decision against the unanimous proposal of the government, and
after a declaration which was given with Norwegian advice, would have
incalculable results. It was in conflict without Constitutional law, it
was denial of the right according to fundamental law of independent
decision on the matter, and a violation of its liberty, independence, and
Sovereignty. It would inevitably lead to the dissolution of the Union.
The Section of the Cabinet Council further stated that no member of the
present Council would countersign such a resolution, and thus give it
constitutional legality. They must therefore tender their letters of
resignation.
His Majesty the King
then read the following reply:
"As it is evident to Me that a new government cannot now be formed I
cannot consent to he resignation of the Ministers."
Furthermore His Majesty referred to the Constitution Sec. 30, and affirmed
that the Ministers had now dutifully "expressed their opinions with
boldness", and "made strong representations" against His decision;
therefore they were free from responsibility. But the same paragraph
reserved to the King the right to make his decisions, "according to His
own judgment." He was therefore entitled, according to fundamental law,
to make the above mentioned decision, and it was the duty of the
Ministers to draw up and countersign the protocol respecting the
negotiations and agreements on the matter.
The Section of Ministers hereupon alleged that according to the
Constitutional law Sec. 15 the Prime Minister was the responsible executive
for the accepted resolutions. Until the decision had been countersigned,
it was not obligatory; a report could, naturally, be given of the
negotiations, but not the customary protocol, including also a Royal
decree.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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