The Referendum is a kind of substitute for the veto; it gives no power to modify, no power to substitute; it is a pure negative. It does not enable the electors to pass laws at their own will; it is a mere veto on such legislation as does not approve itself to the electorate. It is a veto lodged in the hands of a sovereign people. A question is simplified as much as possible, and every citizen has the fullest opportunity, from the public platform, or in the columns of the press, or in private conversation, to advocate or deprecate its adoption; and the entire enfranchised portion of the community is asked to say “Aye” or “No,” as to whether the law shall become operative. It is a reference to the people’s judgment of a distinct, definite, clearly stated law. Under the Constitution of 1848, only such measures passed by the Assembly as clearly involved constitutional changes were subject to the Referendum. The jealousy of the Cantons, lest their own civil and religious privileges should be invaded, and their fear of influences, in the central government, adverse to their own sovereign rights, demanded an unrestricted reference to the popular vote. This was conceded in the revision of 1874, when the Referendum was extended to all federal laws and federal decrees, “of a general nature and not of an urgent character.” The matter now stands thus: no change can be introduced into the constitution which is not sanctioned by the vote of the Swiss people. The Federal Assembly, indeed, may of its own authority pass laws which take effect without any popular vote; but it is practically true that no enactment, important enough to excite effective opposition, can ever become a law until it has received the deliberately expressed sanction of the people. The words “decrees of a general nature and not of an urgent character” have never received even a quasi-judicial construction, either from the Federal Council or from the Federal Assembly, the two organs supervising its execution. There doubtless has been conflicting and arbitrary action taken under it. The weight of opinion, as inferred from the line of precedence, appears to be that resolutions are of a general nature, when they fix permanent and obligatory rules, either for the citizens or the Cantons, but not when they apply only to special cases. The whole detail of the exercise of the Referendum is placed by the constitution, under the regulation of the Assembly, and in June, 1874, soon after the adoption of the constitution, a federal law was passed for carrying it out. All laws and resolutions, on which the popular vote may be demanded, are to be published immediately after their passage, and copies sent to the governments of the several Cantons. Through the Cantons they are brought to the attention of the Communes. The official publication expressly calls attention to the “date of opposition,” or when the period for Referendum expires. This period is ninety days, running