The latitude given cantonal and communal officials in the construction of the federal law of 1876, and the survival of a great body of antiquated cantonal enactments and communal ordinances, which slowly and reluctantly yield to federal legislation, complicate and render almost impossible a compliance with its provisions. It has been held that a renunciation, though presented in proper form, could not be entertained, because the party was under “guardianship.” Not a guardianship under which the law places a minor, but a guardianship authorized by cantonal and communal laws; under which any improvident adult citizen may be placed,--and these local officials are disposed to classify under this head those who emigrate, and propose subsequently to make a renunciation of Swiss citizenship, specially should any inheritance fall to them in the Cantons or Communes. These persons are coerced to return to Switzerland to obtain the possession and enjoyment of such property; or by prolonged absence permit it to escheat, and swell the common fund. Again, a very common ground of objection to renunciation is the alleged fear that the party may at some time, in the future, return to his native country and become a public charge; and this is persisted on in spite of the assurance that he has become a citizen, say, of the United States, a _bona fide_ resident therein, invested with all the privileges and subject to all the obligations pertaining thereto, and if from indigence, sickness, or other cause he should become unable to maintain himself, he has a claim in common with and to the same extent as other citizens of the United States in the provisions made by law for persons reduced to that unfortunate condition, in the State in which he might happen to reside at the time of such contingency. In a recent case (1889), that of “Carl Heinrich Webber (of Philadelphia) vs. The City Council of Zurich,” the plaintiff had left Switzerland during his minority, and in due course of time was naturalized in pursuance of the statute, and desired to secure possession of his property in Zurich for purpose of transfer to the United States. This was resisted by his guardian, on the ground that while his renunciation in its preparation and presentation met the requirements of the law, still he had left Switzerland without the consent of his guardian, and therefore could not legally acquire the domicile in the United States necessary for naturalization there. This plea of the guardian was sustained by the Council of Zurich, and Webber denied his property. On an appeal to the Federal Tribunal, this decision was overruled, only on the ground that the guardian had given an implied assent to the young man’s change of domicile; the court adding that otherwise the plea, as made and sustained by the lower court, would have been affirmed.[62] The judicial doctrine, which so long obtained, that no one could expatriate himself without express