This potential position of Switzerland, a prominent point of moral and political contact between powerful and somewhat antagonistic powers, on the one side confining the limits of the German empire, and on the other setting bounds to the French republic, naturally gives rise to many speculations. The gamut of these is frequently run by the newspapers; Germany making overtures for a treaty undertaking to protect Switzerland’s neutrality; France negotiating for the occupation by Switzerland of the Chablais and Faucigny districts, in Upper Savoy, in accordance with the treaties of 1815 and 1830, thus preventing the intervention of Italy as against France; then the right of Switzerland to occupy certain districts of Savoy, in case of war, is held by the German authorities to have been settled by the Congress of Vienna and needs no further discussion; on the other hand, it is alleged that this right was subsequently denied by Napoleon III., after the annexation of Savoy to France; and as a culmination, Germany makes a serious proposition to Italy for the partition of Switzerland, but Italy declines the offer, preferring to have a little neutral and friendly republic than a great military empire as her neighbor; the proposition is submitted to France in turn, and also declined, as the greater portion of Switzerland being Teutonic in race and tongue, France could get but a small fragment and Italy a still smaller. The theory is also advanced of making Switzerland, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, and Belgium into a sort of federated block of neutral territory, the inviolability of which all the rest of Europe should solemnly pledge itself to accept. Regardless of these diplomatic tergiversations Switzerland continues to be governed according to the choice of its own people, and not according to the _bon plaisir_ of foreign powers. The sort of negative which the Swiss government practises, and which is what the position of the country specially requires, is displayed both in the theory and execution of the Swiss federal system, and by a great prudence in foreign policy. Its policy since the beginning of the sixteenth century has been neutrality. The object of the Congress of Vienna in guaranteeing the neutrality of Switzerland was primarily strategical; it was also felt to be essential that steps should be taken to prevent any one power from gaining possession of the line of the Alps upon the breaking out of a fresh war.[118] The appreciation of this danger was strongly expressed by the First Consul of France, in an address issued in 1803, wherein he announced: “I would have gone to war on account of Switzerland; I would have sacrificed a hundred thousand men, rather than allowed it to remain in the hands of the parties who were at the head of the last insurrection; so great is the influence of its geographical position upon France. The interests of defence bind Switzerland to France; those of attack render it of value