Madison, writes: “The power and duty of a judiciary to disregard an unconstitutional act of Congress or of any State legislature were declared in an argument approaching to the precision and certainty of a mathematical demonstration.”[43] The power was never seriously questioned in the federal courts after that clear and conclusive opinion, and it was gradually established in all the States. The Swiss Federal Tribunal, as a copy, is neither so consistent with sound theory, nor so safe in practice, as its prototype in the United States. The two systems meet by very different devices the problems peculiar to federalism, and especially as concerns the interpretation of the fundamental pact, or articles, or constitution, on which the union rests. In the United States, this function is performed in the last resort by the Supreme Court, and there is perhaps no other part of our system which has extorted more admiration from foreign critics than this exalted prerogative of the judiciary. But the Federal Tribunal of Switzerland is a body of much more limited power and far less dignity. Even its jurisdiction is determined in part by the laws rather than by the constitution. In short, this tribunal appears as a mere instrumentality of the other organs of the government, and not, like the United States Supreme Court, a mediator between them, or even a superior above them. The statesmen of Switzerland felt that a method fit for the United States might be ill-fitted for their own country, where the latitude given to the executive is greater; and the Swiss habit of constantly recurring to popular votes makes it less necessary to restrain the legislature by a permanently enacted instrument. The Swiss constitution itself almost precludes the possibility of encroachment upon its articles by the legislative body. When the sovereign power can easily enforce its will, it may trust to its own action for maintaining its rights; when, as in the United States, the same power acts but rarely and with difficulty, the courts naturally become the guardian of the sovereign’s will expressed in the articles of the constitution. The right to declare laws void is not regarded throughout Europe generally as judicial in its character, and hence has not been intrusted to the courts; this may furnish a partial explanation of the incompetence of the Swiss court in that respect. The Federal Tribunal has been much improved since it was originally set up, and will doubtless, with the decay of unreasonable jealousy of the central government on the part of the Cantons, approach more and more closely the Supreme Court of the United States, of which it is an avowed copy, so far as Swiss political traditions and prejudices would permit in 1848 and 1874. It rests with the Federal Assembly to determine by statutes the particular questions which shall be submitted to the court; these have already been greatly extended, and the court