The following now well known extracts from German documents indicate the effect of our Tanks on the German Army: “Staff officers sent from G.H.Q. report that the reasons for the defeat of the Second Army[81] are as follows: “1. The fact that the troops were surprised by the massed attack of Tanks, and lost their heads when the Tanks suddenly appeared behind them, having broken through under cover of natural and artificial fog. “2. Lack of organised defences. “3. The fact that the artillery allotted to reserve infantry units at the disposal of the Higher Command was wholly insufficient to establish fresh resistance with artillery support against the enemy who had broken through and against his Tanks. “LUDENDORFF, 11. 8. 18.” “_Crown Prince’s Group of Armies._ “12. 8. 18. “G.H.Q. reports that during the recent fighting on the fronts of the 2nd and 18th Armies, large numbers of Tanks broke through on narrow fronts and pushing straight forward, rapidly attacked battery positions and the headquarters of divisions. “In many cases no defence could be made in time against the Tanks, which attacked them from all sides. “Anti-Tank defence must now be developed to deal with such situations.” Signal Communication-- “Messages concerning Tanks will have priority over all other messages or calls whatsoever.” “Order dated 8. 9. 18.” II The first efforts at combating Tanks made by the German High Command were half contemptuously instituted chiefly to reassure their infantry, who seemed to them, for no particular reason, liable to extraordinary fits of nerves and panic upon the approach of their new assailants. The measures of defence were ill devised and carelessly used. In the autumn of 1917, it will be remembered that the Germans had captured a number of our Mark IV. machines. These they used for the purposes of propaganda, parading them in the streets of Berlin and showing them to the Army, as a man might demonstrate the harmless nature of snakes by the aid of a tame cobra. The infantry were lectured to about the miseries endured by the crews who manned Tanks, as to their mechanical defects, their vulnerability and general worthlessness. For example, the following passage appeared in an Order issued to the 7th German Cavalry Division. It will be gathered from the text that the Order was illustrated by detailed drawings. “7th Cavalry ‘Schützen’ Div. Div. H.Q. 26.9.18. “Subject:--Anti-Tank Defence. “_Divisional Order_ “1. _General._ “The infantry must not let itself be frightened by Tanks. The fighting capacity of the Tank is small owing to the bad visibility, and the shooting of the machine-guns and guns is cramped and inaccurate as the result of the motion.