His leadership is more a matter of the spirit and _moral_ which he can infuse into his troops, than of his actual presence in the forefront of the battle. But General Elles had determined to lead his Tanks in person. All the available machines were to be used, there would be no reserves for him to handle. He would be best placed, he argued, in his Flag Tank where he could keep his hand on the pulse of the battle. It must have been with great satisfaction that he perceived that he would here once more be able to indulge his remarkable penchant for battles, a penchant from whose gratification his responsibilities as a commander had now long (officially) debarred him. On the evening before the attack he issued his Special Order to the Tank Corps. It was not the incitement to “do their damnedest” which the contemporary Press fathered upon him. That spurious fosterling he hated the worse, the more he perceived its popularity. His authentic Order was as follows:-- “_Special Order, No. 6_ “1. To-morrow the Tank Corps will have the chance for which it has been waiting for many months, to operate on good going in the van of the battle. “2. All that hard work and ingenuity can achieve has been done in the way of preparation. “3. It remains for unit commanders and for Tank crews to complete the work by judgment and pluck in the battle itself. “4. In the light of past experience I leave the good name of the Corps with great confidence in your hands. “5. I propose leading the attack of the Centre Division. November 19, 1917. (_Signed_) HUGH ELLES, “B.-G. Commanding Tank Corps.” The statement that the G.O.C. was to lead the attack came as a great surprise to every one; it was probably a greater surprise to some of the authorities than it was even to the Tank Corps themselves. This decision was generally accepted with pleasure by the fighting troops, but many of the more thoughtful were filled with very great anxiety. It was clear that the General’s Tank, the “Hilda,” was going to be thrust close behind the barrage in a conspicuous position flying the flag; the dangers that it ran were, therefore, greater than those run by any of the other Tanks. On the other hand, it was generally realised that the Tank Corps had, in this action, a very great deal at stake; it risked not merely machines and the lives of its officers and men, but its very existence. If the Tanks failed to make good this time there is little doubt that this type of mechanical warfare would have been abandoned for some time at least. On November 20, therefore, the Tank Corps was “all in” in every sense of the word. IV At 4.30 on the morning of the 20th a heavy burst of firing from the enemy made us fear for the integrity of our secret, but to our great relief it died away, and for an hour before zero (6 a.m.) quiet reigned along almost the whole front of attack.