The first uneasiness over the bill which its authors felt was along the line of foreign markets. We were not conquering them as rapidly as we ought, or as we must, if our tremendous production was to be disposed of. That which the thoughtful had been warning against was happening. In our zeal to produce, we had not intelligently arranged what we were to do with our products. The Dingley Bill had, it is true, provided a scheme of reciprocity. The really important provision in the scheme gave the President power to negotiate trade treaties with any country, subject to ratifications by the Senate. Mr. McKinley soon after his inauguration appointed a special plenipotentiary to negotiate these treaties,—John H. Kasson, who had always been a moderate protectionist, and who had seen the capitulation of the party to the manufacturers of the country with disgust and dread. Mr. Kasson undertook the work with enthusiasm. By 1900 he had several treaties signed and before the Senate. The most important one was with France. By this treaty we could import into her territory a very large number of articles at a minimum duty, and we in return were to give her a reduced duty on many of her products. Not only Mr. Kasson, but Mr. McKinley himself urged the ratification of these treaties. There was no doubt but that the public generally favored them. But there had appeared in opposition the same forces which had made the McKinley Bill, the Wilson Bill, and Dingley Bill what they were,—political measures, trading contracts, by which for so much influence, so much duty was given. These nervous, superstitious, and greedy forces decided against reciprocity. The nature of their opposition was very well summarized in one of the hearings on the subject by a manufacturer who was himself in favor of the French treaty.