The Tariff in Our TimesTarbell, Ida M. (Ida Minerva)
History
The Tariff in Our Times
Tarbell, Ida M. (Ida Minerva)
Tariff -- United States -- History
It was October when the commission terminated its public hearings and
settled down to prepare its reports. The scrappiness of the testimony,
the evident absorption of the majority of the witnesses in their own
interests and not those of the country, the little attention given to
commerce and the consumer, the failure to get anything like exact
statistics, created the impression that nothing important would result.
A bad impression was made on the public, too, by the flock of
individuals which everywhere hovered around the commission apparently to
say to it privately what they did not care to say on the witness stand.
These persons beset the members as they dined, walked, rode across
country in their special train. They invited them to dinner and to the
theatres—a horde of hungry duty-hunters who did more to demonstrate to
the fair-minded members of the commission the peculiar evils inherent in
any protective system than reams of the ablest theoretical teaching
could have done.
The report was submitted to Congress in December, and its publication
was a surprise all around. It was far more intelligent, far-reaching,
and disinterested than a cynical public had expected. Poor Mr. Henry
Carey Baird, the quinine-makers, the whole band of duty-grabbers, were
in dismay. They had been betrayed, they said, and it was young Mr.
Porter who had done it. He was an Englishman. It was evident he was an
emissary of British free traders, sent over by them as a boy to be
educated for the task of undermining American prosperity.
No tariff reformer indeed could have asked a better platform than that
on which the Commissioners claimed they had worked. Early in their
deliberations, they said, they had come to the conclusion that a
substantial reduction was demanded—that it was necessary for general
industrial prosperity. “_No rates of defensive duties_,” declared the
commission, “_except for the establishment of new industries which more
than equalize the conditions of labor and capital with those of foreign
competitors, can be justified._ Excessive duties, or those above such
standard of equalization, are positively injurious to the interest which
they are supposed to benefit.” They encourage “rash and unskilled
speculation” to go into business, they “discredit our whole national
economic system,” they cause “uncertainty,” destroy the “sense of
stability required for extended undertakings.” No such “extraordinary
stimulus” as the war taxes gave was now necessary. The great
improvements in machinery and processes made in twenty years “would
permit our manufacturers to compete with their foreign rivals under a
substantial reduction of existing duties.” Twenty per cent was the
general reduction which they had decided manufacturing could support,
and they estimated that the changes they proposed would produce a
reduction of fully 25 per cent.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account