When some one may do you an injury, or speak ill of you, remember that he either does it or speaks it believing that it is right and meet for him to do so. It is not possible, then, that he can follow the thing that appears to you, but the thing that appears to him. Wherefore, if it appear evil to him, it is he that is injured, being deceived. For also if any one should take a true consequence to be false, it is not the consequence that is injured, but he which is deceived. Setting out, then, from these opinions, you will bear a gentle mind towards any man who may revile you. For, say on each occasion, _So it appeared to him_. CHAPTER XIV. THAT EVERYTHING HATH TWO HANDLES. Every matter hath two handles—by the one it may be carried; by the other, not. If thy brother do thee wrong, take not this thing by the handle, _He wrongs me_; for that is the handle whereby it may not be carried. But take it rather by the handle, _He is my brother, nourished with me_; and thou wilt take it by a handle whereby it may be carried. CHAPTER XV. ON CERTAIN FALSE CONCLUSIONS. There is no true conclusion in these reasonings: _I am richer than thou, therefore I am better_: _I am more eloquent than thou, therefore I am better_. But the conclusions are rather these: _I am richer than thou, therefore my wealth is better_: _I am more eloquent than thou, therefore my speech is better_. But thou art not wealth, and thou art not speech. CHAPTER XVI. PERCEPTION AND JUDGMENT. 1. Doth a man bathe himself quickly? Then, say not, _Wrongly_, but _Quickly_. Doth he drink much wine? Then say not, _Wrongly_, but _Much_. For whence do you know if it were ill done till you have understood his opinion? 2. Thus it shall not befall you to assent to any other things than those whereof you are truly and directly sensible.[1] 3. What is the cause of assenting to anything? The appearance that it is so. But if it appear to be not so, it is impossible to assent to it. Wherefore? For that this is the nature of the mind, to receive the true with favor, the false with disfavor, and the uncertain with indifference. The proof of this? Be sure, if you can, at this moment, that it is night. You cannot. Cease to be sure that it is day. You cannot. Be sure that the stars are odd in number, or that they are even. You cannot. When, therefore, any man shall assent to what is false, know that he had no will to consent to falsehood; for, as saith Plato, no soul is willingly deprived of the truth, but the false appeared to it to be true. Come, then, what have we in actions corresponding to this true and false? The seemly and the unseemly, the profitable and the unprofitable, that which concerns me and that which doth not concern me, and such like. Can any man think that a certain thing is for his profit, and not elect to do it? He cannot. How, then, is it with her who saith—