1. Beliefs which are sound and manifestly true are of necessity used even by those who deny them. And perhaps a man might adduce this as the greatest possible proof of the manifest truth of anything, that those who deny it are compelled to make use of it. Thus, if a man should deny that there is anything universally true, it is clear that he is obliged to affirm the contrary, the negation—that there is nothing universally true. Slave! not even this—for what is this but to say that if there is anything universal it is falsehood? 2. Again, if one should come and say, _Know that nothing can be known, but all things are incapable of proof; or another, Believe me, and it shall profit thee, that no man ought to believe any man_; or again, another, _Learn from me, O man, that it is not possible to learn anything, and I tell thee this, and I will teach thee, if thou wilt_—now wherein do such men differ from those—whom shall I say?—those who call themselves Academics? _Assent, O men, that no man can assent to aught; believe us that no man can believe any one._ 3. Thus Epicurus, when he would abolish the natural fellowship of men with one another, employeth the very thing that is being abolished. For what saith he? _Be not deceived, O men, nor misguided nor mistaken—there is no natural fellowship among reasoning beings, believe me; and those who speak otherwise deceive us with sophisms._ What is that to thee? let us be deceived! Will it be the worse for thee if all other men are persuaded that we have a natural fellowship with one another, and that we should in all ways maintain it? Nay—but much the better and safer. Man, why dost thou take thought for us, and watch at night for our sakes? Why dost thou kindle thy lamp and rise early? why dost thou write so many books, lest any of us should be deceived about the Gods, in supposing that they cared for men? or lest any one should take the essence of the Good to be anything else than Pleasure? For if these things are so, then lie down and sleep, and live the life of a worm, wherefor thou hast judged thyself fit; eat and drink and cohabit and ease thyself and snore. What is it to thee how other men think concerning these matters, whether soundly or unsoundly? What hast thou to do with us? With sheep hast thou some concern, for that they serve us when they are shorn, and when they are milked, and at last when they have their throats cut. Were it not, then, to be desired, if men could be lulled and charmed to slumber by the Stoics, and give themselves to thee and the like of thee, to be shorn and milked? These things shouldst thou say to thy brother Epicureans; but shouldst thou not keep them hidden from other men, and seek in every way to persuade them above all things that we are by nature social, and that temperance is good; in order that everything may be kept for thee? Or should we preserve this fellowship with some and not with others? With whom, then, should we