The Teaching of Epictetus: Being the 'Encheiridion of Epictetus,' with Selections from the 'Dissertations' and 'Fragments'Epictetus
Philosophy
The Teaching of Epictetus: Being the 'Encheiridion of Epictetus,' with Selections from the 'Dissertations' and 'Fragments'
Epictetus
Philosophy, Ancient
And so are some incantations, but in that they are useful I regard not
this; only let them be of use. But dost thou call anything of ill-omen,
save only that which betokeneth some evil? Cowardice is a word of
ill-omen, and baseness and grief and mourning and shamelessness, these
words are of ill-omen. And not even them must we dread to speak, if so
we may defend ourselves against the things. But wilt thou say that any
word is of ill-omen that betokeneth some natural thing? Say that it is
of ill-omen to speak of the reaping of ears of corn, for it betokeneth
the destruction of the ears—but not of the universe. Say that the
falling of the leaves is of ill-omen, and the dried fig coming in the
place of the green, and raisins in the place of grapes. For all these
things are changes from the former estate to another; no destruction,
but a certain appointed order and disposition. Here is parting for
foreign lands, and a little change. Here is death—a greater change, not
from that which now is to that which is not, but to that which is not
now.
CHAPTER IX.
ON SOLITUDE.
1. Solitude is the state of one who is helpless. For he who is alone is
not therefore solitary; even as he who is in a great company is not
therefore not solitary. When, therefore, we have lost a brother or a son
or a friend on whom we were wont to rest, we say that we are left
solitary, and oftentimes we say it in Rome, with such a crowd meeting us
and so many dwelling about us, and, it may be, having a multitude of
slaves. For the solitary man, in his conception, meaneth to be thought
helpless, and laid open to those who wish him harm. Therefore when we
are on a journey we then, above all, say that we are solitary when we
are fallen among thieves; for that which taketh away solitude is not the
sight of a man, but of a faithful and pious and serviceable man. For if
to be solitary it sufficeth to be alone, then say that Zeus is solitary
in the conflagration,[1] and bewails himself. _Woe is me! I have neither
Hera nor Athene nor Apollo_, nor, in short, either brother or son or
descendant or kinsman. And so some say he doth when alone in the
conflagration. For they comprehend not the life of a man who is alone,
setting out from a certain natural principle, that we are by nature
social, and inclined to love each other, and pleased to be in the
company of other men. But none the less is it needful that one find the
means to this also, to be able to suffice to himself, and to be his own
companion. For as Zeus is his own companion, and is content with
himself, and considereth his own government, what it is, and is occupied
in designs worthy of himself; thus should we be able to converse with
ourselves, and feel no need of others, nor want means to pass the time;
but to observe the divine government, and the relation of ourselves with
other things; to consider how we stood formerly towards the events that
befall us, and how we stand now; what things they are that still afflict
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