The Theistic Conception of the World: An Essay in Opposition to Certain Tendencies of Modern ThoughtCocker, B. F. (Benjamin Franklin)
Religion
The Theistic Conception of the World: An Essay in Opposition to Certain Tendencies of Modern Thought
Cocker, B. F. (Benjamin Franklin)
Theism
It is to be deplored that certain Christian writers have deemed it
necessary, on what they consider moral grounds, to give countenance to
theories which in one form or another ascribe a real efficiency to
natural laws, and dispense with the immediate and ceaseless agency of
God in the conservation of the world. They imagine that some such
hypothesis is needed to vindicate the Divine honor and righteousness. In
their imagination, it derogates from the Divine majesty to be
ceaselessly concerned and busied with the minute and insignificant
operations of nature, or even cognizant of them. His eternal serenity
would be disturbed, and his unsullied purity compromised by any
connection therewith, and He would become responsible for the disorders
and abnormities, the evils and sufferings, which appear in the world. He
must, therefore, be released from a constant and direct connection with
the universe. He must leave nature to the necessary predestinated course
of self-evolution, or, if He interpose at all, it must be in some
exceptional, extraordinary, and supernatural way; so that, if there be a
providential administration, every act and incident thereof must be a
_miracle_.
We respect the motives, but we can not approve the procedure or commend
the logic of these theologians. The moral difficulties they would by
these hypotheses evade still remain in all their force. "Any hypothesis
which essays to relieve these difficulties from pressing against
Providence only transfers and leaves them to press with equal force
against an original creation."[231] The Supreme Intelligence which
originally endowed matter with its properties, and ordained the laws of
force, must have foreseen all possible combinations, interactions, and
consequences, and, if it be proper to speak of responsibilities in this
connection, must be as responsible for these consequences as though they
were the direct effect of immediate volition. An agent is accountable
not only for his acts, but for all the foreseen consequences of his
acts. The solution of these difficulties must be sought in another
field.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account