It is affirmed by the advocates of this hypothesis that "the grand principle of the uniformity and constancy of natural causes is _a primary law of belief_ so strongly entertained by the truly inductive inquirer that he can not conceive the _possibility_ of its failure."[234] As science extends her domain and pushes her discoveries into new regions, cases that once seemed anomalous are found to be conformable to this general rule, and therefore we are justified in assuming the absolute uniformity and inviolability of natural law through all the realms of time and space. Thus we reach "the grand inductive conclusion of the universal and _eternal_ order of nature." But an _overruling_ providence must step beyond _ordinary rule_: it must control, interrupt, modify, or in some manner give a new direction to the action of nature, and thus become _super_natural--that is, miraculous. So that were we even to concede the phenomenal reality of the miracles recorded in the New Testament, and to accept them as "objects of faith, but not as the evidences of faith," still modern science would forbid us to believe that any supernatural interposition can _now_ take place. Not a single instance of counteraction or control of natural law can now be authenticated, and therefore we must regard special providence as incredible and impossible. The first error, and indeed the fundamental error, of this hypothesis is the assumption that the absolute uniformity and permanence of nature is "_a primary law of belief_," and therefore the natural philosopher "must set out with clear ideas of the _possible_ and the _impossible_." Now we grant that had we such _à priori_ conviction of the permanence and immutability of nature, then it would be impossible to prove that the order of nature had a beginning, or that there could be any interference with the agencies or laws of nature by a supernatural power. "No evidence adduced in favor of a creation or of Divine interposition could ever be so strong as to overcome the necessary belief in direct opposition to it."[235] But the truth is, we have no such intuitive conviction. Our belief has none of the characteristics of an _à priori_ intuition: it is neither self-evident nor universal nor necessary. John Stuart Mill has successfully shown that this belief is the result of experience, that it is entertained only by the cultivated and educated few, and that even among such it has been of slow growth. Therefore he properly concludes that "the uniformity in the succession of events ... must be received, _not as the law of the universe, but of that portion only which is within the range of our means of observation_, with a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases."[236]