3. The third hypothesis is that of a _plastic nature_, intermediate between God and the material universe, by which all the phenomena of visible nature are produced. This hypothesis was first presented (at least in modern times) by Ralph Cudworth, in his "True Intellectual System of the Universe."[297] In opposition to Democritus, who explained all phenomena by means of matter and motion; and also in opposition to Strato, who taught that matter is the only substance, but at the same time a living and active force, Cudworth maintains that there is a _plastic nature_--a vital and spiritual, but unconscious energy, distinct from and created by the Deity, which "doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence which consisteth in the regular and orderly motion of matter,"[298] and in the organization and development of plants and animals, "according to laws prescribed for it by a perfect intellect, and impressed upon it."[299] This _plastic nature_ is an "inferior kind of life or soul," destitute of all consciousness,[300] which, though it "acts for the sake of ends," does "not know the reason of what it does," and therefore operates "fatally and sympathetically."[301] The arguments urged by Cudworth in support of this hypothesis are mainly of a negative character. On the one hand he endeavors to show that force and vitality are not essential attributes of matter, and on the other hand that the motion and life of the universe can not be properly regarded as the direct action of the Deity upon matter. It is with this latter part of the argument that we are here immediately concerned. He urges (1) that if every thing in nature were done immediately by God, it would render Divine Providence "oporose, solicitous, and distractious;" and, furthermore, it would be unbecoming the Divine Majesty, and "indecorous," for God "immediately to do all the meanest and triflingest things Himself drudgingly." He maintains (2) that if God do all things immediately, then he does them "_miraculously_"--that is, "forcibly and violently." And (3) that the immediate agency of God is inconsistent with that slow and gradual development of things we see in nature, which would seem to be a "trifling formality" if the agent were omnipotent, and especially inconsistent with "those errors and bunglings which are committed when the matter is inept and contumacious." "Wherefore it may be concluded that there is a plastic nature under God which, as an inferior agent, doth drudgingly execute that part of his providence which consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter, yet so that there is also a higher providence, which, _presiding_ over it, doth often supply the defects of it, and sometimes _overrule_ it; forasmuch as the plastic nature can not act electively nor with discretion." So that, after all, as Plato says, God "is the beginning and end and middle of all things," and therefore their being is "_as much to be ascribed to