final and only conclusion is that God, "the Self-existent Being," is the one only underlying reality or _substance_ in the universe; all the force in the universe is "the force of the Creative Will," and all the intelligence in the universe a modification of the Divine Thought. This, however, is Pantheism, even according to that very defective definition of Pantheism given by Mr. Murphy: "Pantheism is the identification of the Divine power and intelligence with the powers and intelligences that work in the world of matter and mind."[320] Still, Mr. Murphy declares, "I am not a Pantheist;" and we are bound to accept his disclaimer--"the power and intelligence which work in nature are not identical with the Divine power and intelligence." Be it so; then there is power, and there is intelligence in nature, which are not attributes of any reality, and which do not inhere in any substance; and we come round to the original difficulty of conceiving of an attribute apart from a subject. The reader can not have failed to see that Mr. Murphy has been leading us round a vicious circle. "Force is a function of matter, and matter is a function of force."[321] "Matter is only explicable as a function of force, force only explicable as a function of conscious mind,"[322] and mind is "one of the functions of matter."[323] "It is perfectly certain," says Mr. Murphy, "that inductive psychology gives no hint of any mental _substance_ as distinguished from the material substance of the brain."[324] But the material substance of the brain after all is not material; "matter can only be conceived as _spiritual_"[325]--that is, as _force_. There is no underlying reality which men call "matter," and there is no underlying reality which men call "spirit." Matter is spirit, spirit is matter; but in reality neither the one nor the other has any substantial reality. If all finite existences are but modes of the Infinite Being, we have a consistent Pantheism at any rate. But if all finite existences are simply phenomena without any underlying reality, then "perception is a dream, and my existence the dream of that dream." Thirdly, the hypothesis of an "_unconscious intelligence_," distinct from the Supreme Intelligence, which does "the drudgery of Providence," and to which the defects and disorders and "immoralities" of nature are ascribed, is neither adequate nor satisfactory. The conceit of Cudworth that it is unbecoming the Divine Majesty to be immediately concerned in every thing that takes place in nature is scarcely worthy of consideration: "If it were not congruous in respect of the state and majesty of Xerxes, the king of Persia, that he should condescend to do all the meanest offices himself, much less can this be thought decorous in respect of God."[326] Human conceptions of what is great or small, dignified or indecorous, are merely relative conceptions which vary with our knowledge, culture, and taste; but--