The Theistic Conception of the World: An Essay in Opposition to Certain Tendencies of Modern ThoughtCocker, B. F. (Benjamin Franklin)
Religion
The Theistic Conception of the World: An Essay in Opposition to Certain Tendencies of Modern Thought
Cocker, B. F. (Benjamin Franklin)
Theism
Driven from this boasted stronghold, the necessitarian resorts to his
favorite dialectic strategy. He demands the explanation of equipotent
causation, how one cause can be adequate to several effects. He asks,
_What causes the will to put forth one particular volition rather than
another?_
Now when we have shown that, as a fact of consciousness and experience,
a personal, _spiritual_ cause is adequate to several results, we are
entitled in reason and justice to protest against any attempt to push
the inquiry a step farther. We have attained an ultimate fact, and we
have no right to cast doubt upon its authority by raising perplexing
questions as to the _how_ or _why_ of that which _is_. This is precisely
the method by which the atheist Holyoake would invalidate the argument
for the existence of the infinite First Cause. He subjects the Deity to
this universal law of causality, and asks, What caused the Creator to
create? "The atheist holds that the universe is an endless series of
causes and effects _ad infinitum_, and therefore the idea of a _first_
cause is an absurdity and a contradiction." The "infinite series" of
Edwards and of Holyoake are constructed on the same principle. They both
ask _a_ cause for _the_ cause.
When, therefore, it is asked, What causes the will to effect one
volition rather than another? our answer is, _Nothing whatever!_
"Of its own effect, WILL, in its proper conditions, is not a partial,
but a full and adequate cause. Put your finger upon any effect
(volition) and ask, What caused this result exclusively of the others?
and the reply is, The will, or the agent in willing. Ask then what
caused the will in its conditions to cause the volition, and the reply
is, NOTHING. Nay, you are a bad philosopher in asking; for for its own
effect will or the willing agent is a complete cause: as complete a
cause as any cause whatever; _and every complete cause produces its
effect_ UNCAUSEDLY. The volition, like every other effect, is completely
accounted for when a complete cause is assigned. To ask what caused the
complete cause to produce the effect is to ask the cause of
causation."[534]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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