The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
As ignorant and groundless praise can give no solid joy, no satisfaction
that will bear any serious examination, so, on the contrary, it often
gives real comfort to reflect, that though no praise should actually be
bestowed upon us, our conduct, however, has been such as to deserve it,
and has been in every respect suitable to those measures and rules by
which praise and approbation are naturally and commonly bestowed. We are
pleased not only with praise, but with having done what is
praise-worthy. We are pleased to think that we have rendered ourselves
the natural objects of approbation, though no approbation, should ever
actually be bestowed upon us: and we are mortified to reflect that we
have justly incurred the blame of those we live with, though that
sentiment should never actually be exerted against us. The man who is
conscious to himself that he has exactly observed those measures of
conduct which experience informs him are generally agreeable, reflects
with satisfaction on the propriety of his own behaviour; when he views
it in the light in which the impartial spectator would view it, he
thoroughly enters into all the motives which influenced it; he looks
back upon every part of it with pleasure and approbation, and though
mankind should never be acquainted with what he has done, he regards
himself not so much according to the light in which they actually regard
him, as according to that, in which they would regard him if they were
better informed. He anticipates the applause and admiration which in
this case would be bestowed upon him, and he applauds and admires
himself by sympathy with sentiments which do not indeed actually take
place, but which the ignorance of the public alone hinders from taking
place, which he knows are the natural and ordinary effects of such
conduct, which his imagination strongly connects with it, and which he
has acquired a habit of conceiving as something that naturally and in
propriety ought to flow from it. Men have often voluntarily thrown away
life to acquire after death a renown which they could no longer enjoy.
Their imagination, in the mean time, anticipated that fame which was
thereafter to be bestowed upon them. Those applauses which they were
never to hear rung in their ears; the thoughts of that admiration, whose
effects they were never to feel, played about their hearts, banished
from their breasts the strongest of all natural fears, and transported
them to perform actions which seem aimed beyond the reach of human
nature. But in point of reality there is surely no great difference
between that approbation which is not to be bestowed till we can no
longer enjoy it, and that which indeed is never to be bestowed, but
which would be bestowed if the world was ever made to understand
properly the real circumstances of our behaviour. If the one often
produces such violent effects, we cannot wonder that the other should
always be highly regarded.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account