The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
The first are those melancholy moralists, who are perpetually
reproaching us with our happiness, while so many of our brethren are in
misery,[6] who regard as impious the natural joy of prosperity, which
does not think of the many wretches that are at every instant labouring
under all sorts of calamities, in the languor of poverty, in the agony
of disease, in the horrors of death, under the insults and oppression of
their enemies. Commiseration for those miseries which we never saw,
which we never heard of, but which we may be assured are at all times
infecting such numbers of our fellow-creatures, ought, they think, to
damp the pleasures of the fortunate, and to render a certain melancholy
dejection habitual to all men. But first of all, this extreme sympathy
with misfortunes, which we know nothing about, seems altogether absurd
and unreasonable. Take the whole earth at an average, for one man who
suffers pain or misery, you will find twenty in prosperity and joy, or
at least in tolerable circumstances. No reason, surely, can be assigned
why we should rather weep with the one than rejoice with the twenty.
This artificial commiseration, besides, is not only absurd, but seems
altogether unattainable; and those who affect this character have
commonly nothing but a certain hypocritical sadness, which, without
reaching the heart, serves only to render the countenance and
convocation impertinently dismal and disagreeable. And last of all, this
disposition of mind, though it could be attained, would be perfectly
useless, and could serve no other purpose than to render miserable the
person who was possessed of it. Whatever interest we take in the fortune
of those with whom we have no acquaintance or connexion, and who are
placed altogether out of the sphere of our activity, can produce only
anxiety to ourselves, without any manner of advantage to them. To what
purpose should we trouble ourselves about the world in the moon? All
men, even those at the greatest distance, are no doubt entitled to our
good wishes, and our good wishes we naturally give them. But if,
notwithstanding, they should be unfortunate, to give ourselves any
anxiety upon that account, seems to be no part of our duty. That we
should be but little interested, therefore, in the fortune of those whom
we can neither serve nor hurt, and who are in every respect so very
remote from us, seems wisely ordered by nature; and if it were possible
to alter in this respect the original constitution of our frame, we
could yet gain nothing by the change.
Footnote 6:
See Thomson’s Seasons, Winter:
“Ah! little think the gay licentious proud,” &c.
See also Pascal.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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