The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
The general rules of almost all the virtues, the general rules which
determine what are the offices of prudence, of charity, of generosity,
of gratitude, of friendship, are in many respects loose and inaccurate,
admit of many exceptions, and require so many modifications, that it is
scarce possible to regulate our conduct entirely by a regard to them.
The common proverbial maxims of prudence, being founded in universal
experience, are perhaps the best general rules which can be given about
it. To affect, however, a very strict and literal adherence to them
would evidently be the most absurd and ridiculous pedantry. Of all the
virtues I have just now mentioned, gratitude is that, perhaps, of which
the rules are the most precise, and admit of the fewest exceptions. That
as soon as we can we should make a return of equal, and if possible of
superior value to the services we have received, would seem to be a
pretty plain rule, and one which admitted of scarce any exceptions. Upon
the most superficial examination, however, this rule will appear to be
in the highest degree loose and inaccurate, and to admit of ten thousand
exceptions. If your benefactor attended you in your sickness, ought you
to attend him in his? or can you fulfil the obligation of gratitude, by
making a return of a different kind? If you ought to attend him, how
long ought you to attend him? The same time which he attended you, or
longer, and how much longer? If your friend lent you money in your
distress, ought you to lend him money in his? How much ought you to lend
him? When ought you to lend him? Now, or to-morrow, or next month? And
for how long a time? It is evident, that no general rule can be laid
down, by which a precise answer can, in all cases, be given to any of
these questions. The difference between his character and yours, between
his circumstances and yours, may be such, that you may be perfectly
grateful, and justly refuse to lend him a halfpenny: and, on the
contrary, you may be willing to lend, or even to give him ten times the
sum which he lent you, and yet justly be accused of the blackest
ingratitude, and of not having fulfilled the hundredth part of the
obligation you lie under. As the duties of gratitude, however, are
perhaps the most sacred of all those which the beneficent virtues
prescribe to us, so the general rules which determine them are, as I
said before, the most accurate. Those which ascertain the actions
required by friendship, humanity, hospitality, generosity, are still
more vague and indeterminate.
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