The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
But though the invention of nouns adjective be much more natural than
that of the abstract nouns substantive derived from them, it would
still, however, require a considerable degree of abstraction and
generalization. Those, for example, who first invented the words,
_green_, _blue_, _red_, and the other names of colours, must have
observed and compared together a great number of objects, must have
remarked their resemblances and dissimilitudes in respect of the quality
of colour, and must have arranged them, in their own minds, into
different classes and assortments, according to those resemblances and
dissimilitudes. An adjective is by nature a general, and in some
measure, an abstract word, and necessarily presupposes the idea of a
certain species or assortment of things, to all of which it is equally
applicable. The word _green_ could not, as we were supposing might be
the case of the word _cave_, have been originally the name of an
individual, and afterwards have become, by what grammarians call an
Antonomasia the name of a species. The word _green_ denoting, not the
name of a substance, but the peculiar quality of a substance, must from
the very first have been a general word, and considered as equally
applicable to any other substance possessed of the same quality. The man
who first distinguished a particular object by the epithet of _green_,
must have observed other objects that were not _green_, from which he
meant to separate it by this appellation. The institution of this name,
therefore, supposes comparison. It likewise supposes some degree of
abstraction. The person who first invented this appellation must have
distinguished the quality from the object to which it belonged, and must
have conceived the object as capable of subsisting without the quality.
The invention, therefore, even of the simplest nouns adjective, must
have required more metaphysics than we are apt to be aware of. The
different mental operations, of arrangement or classing, of comparison,
and of abstraction, must all have been employed, before even the names
of the different colours, the least metaphysical of all nouns adjective,
could be instituted. From all which I infer, that when languages were
beginning to be formed, nouns adjective would by no means be the words
of the earliest invention.
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