The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
But though the necessary assistance should not be afforded from such
generous and disinterested motives, though among the different members
of the society there should be no mutual love and affection, the
society, though less happy and agreeable, will not necessarily be
dissolved. Society may subsist among different men, as among different
merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love or
affection; and though no man in it should owe any obligation, or be
bound in gratitude to any other, it may still be upheld by a mercenary
exchange of good offices according to an agreed valuation.
Society, however, cannot subsist among those who are at all times ready
to hurt and injure one another. The moment that injury begins, the
moment that mutual resentment and animosity take place, all the bands of
it are broke asunder, and the different members of which it consisted
are, as it were, dissipated and scattered abroad by the violence and
opposition of their discordant affections. If there is any society among
robbers and murderers, they must at least, according to the trite
observation, abstain from robbing and murdering one another.
Beneficence, therefore, is less essential to the exigence of society
than justice. Society may subsist, though not in the most comfortable
state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly
destroy it.
Though Nature, therefore, exhorts mankind to acts of beneficence, by the
pleasing consciousness of deserved reward, she has not thought it
necessary to guard and enforce the practice of it by the terrors of
merited punishment in case it should be neglected. It is the ornament
which embellishes, not the foundation which supports the building, and
which it was, therefore, sufficient to recommend, but by no means
necessary to impose. Justice, on the contrary, is the main pillar that
upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, the great, the immense
fabric of human society, that fabric which to raise and support seems in
this world, if I may say so, to have been the peculiar and darling care
of Nature, must in a moment crumble into atoms. In order to enforce the
observation of justice, therefore, Nature has implanted in the human
breast that consciousness of ill desert, those terrors of merited
punishment which attend upon its violation, as the great safe-guards of
the association of mankind, to protect the weak, to curb the violent,
and to chastise the guilty. Men, though naturally sympathetic, feel so
little for another, with whom they have no particular connexion, in
comparison for what they feel for themselves; the misery of one, who is
merely their fellow-creature, is of so little importance to them in
comparison even of a small conveniency of their own; they have it so
much in their power to hurt him, and may have so many temptations to do
so, that if this principle did not stand up within them in his defence,
and overawe them into a respect for his innocence, they would, like wild
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