and to forfeit all landed possessions acquired by British subjects in New Zealand. He condemned the Bill absolutely, because he claimed to have established on incontestable grounds, and by the aid of indisputable authorities, the right of British subjects to buy land from the New Zealanders, a right which could not be taken away until the Council passed an Act to restrain it. Under these circumstances it was highly illegal to proceed to divest parties of their possessions without adequate compensation, such as was given in England when land was required for public purposes. The compensation to be given in such cases must always be awarded by a jury; therefore the proposed Bill was clearly repugnant to the laws of England. Only a few days previously the Council had passed an Ordinance, making all the laws of England and of the colony of New South Wales applicable to New Zealand. Amongst these was the right of trial by jury of which the proposed Bill was completely subversive; it took away the right of trial by jury; and therefore, declared Mr. Wentworth, the Council could not pass it, or if they did, the Judges could not certify to it. These arguments were reiterated and amplified by the two barristers, Messrs. A'Beckett and Darvell, and on July 9 their official refutation was placed before the Council by Sir George Gipps, who on that day delivered in reply a speech remarkable for its broad grasp of constitutional history, as well as for its fearless declaration of the attitude adopted by the Crown. It was during the development of this smashing rebuttal that the objectors were enlightened as to the three great principles of law upon which the second clause of the treaty was founded; "principles, which, until I heard them here controverted," said Sir George, "I thought were fully admitted, and indeed received as political maxims." Briefly these were: 1. That the uncivilised inhabitants of any country have but a qualified domain over it, or a right of occupancy only; and that, until they establish amongst themselves a settled form of government, and subjudicate the ground to their own uses by the cultivation of it, they cannot grant to individuals, not of their own tribe, any portion of it, for the simple reason that they have not themselves any individual property in it. 2. That if a settlement be made in any such country by a civilised power, the right of pre-emption to the soil, or in other words, the right of extinguishing the native title, is exclusively in the Government of that power, and cannot be enjoyed by individuals without the consent of the Government.