clear and undoubted claim; to have attempted to deprive them of their patches of potato-ground, even so to have occupied the territory as not to leave them ample space for shifting, as was their habit, their cultivation from one spot to another, would have been in the highest degree unjust; but so long as this injustice was avoided, I must regard it as a vain and unfounded scruple which would have acknowledged their rights of property in land which they did not occupy; it is obvious that they could not convey to others what they did not themselves possess, and that claims to vast tracts of waste land, founded on pretended sales from them, are altogether untenable. From the moment that British dominion was proclaimed in New Zealand, all lands not actually occupied in the sense in which alone occupation can give the right of possession, ought to have been considered as the property of the Crown in its capacity of trustee for the whole community, and it should thenceforward have been regarded as the right, and at the same time the duty of those duly authorised by the Crown, to determine in what manner and according to what rules the land hitherto waste should be assigned and appropriated to particular individuals. There is another consideration which leads to the same conclusion. It has never been pretended that the wide extent of unoccupied land, to which an exclusive right of property has been asserted on behalf of the native inhabitants of New Zealand, belonged to them as individuals, it was only as tribes that they were supposed to possess it, and granting their title as such to have been good and valid, it was obviously a right which the tribes enjoyed as independent communities--an attribute of sovereignty, which, with the sovereignty, naturally and necessarily was transferred to the British Crown. Had the New Zealanders been a civilised people this would have been the case--if these islands, being inhabited by a civilised people, had been added either by conquest or by voluntary cession to the dominions of the Queen, it is clear, that according to the well-known principles of public law, while the property of individuals would have been respected, all public property, all rights of every description which have appertained to the previous sovereigns, would have devolved, as a matter of course, to the new sovereign who succeeded them. It can hardly be contended that these tribes, as such, possessed rights which civilised communities could not have claimed.