The Trial of Theodore Parker: For the "Misdemeanor" of a Speech in Faneuil Hall against Kidnapping, before the Circuit Court of the United States, at Boston, April 3, 1855, with the DefenceParker, Theodore
Religion
The Trial of Theodore Parker: For the "Misdemeanor" of a Speech in Faneuil Hall against Kidnapping, before the Circuit Court of the United States, at Boston, April 3, 1855, with the Defence
Parker, Theodore
Antislavery movements -- Massachusetts -- Boston; United States -- Fugitive slave law (1850)
To answer that question you are to consult your own mind and
conscience. You are not to take the opinion of the Court. For (1.) it
would probably be their purchased _official_ opinion which the
government pays for, and so is of no value whatever; or (2.) if it be
their _personal_ opinion, from what Mr. Sprague and Mr. Curtis have
said and done before, you know that their personal opinion in the
matter would be of no value whatsoever. To me it is very plain that
kidnapping a man in Boston and making him a slave, is not the way to
form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquillity, provide for the Common Defence, promote the General
Welfare, or secure the Blessings of Liberty. But you are to judge for
yourselves. If you think the fugitive slave bill not a Means towards
that End, which this national Power of Attorney proposes, then you
will think it is unconstitutional, that Mr. Freeman was not in the
peace of the United States, but acting against it; and then it was the
Right of every citizen to obstruct his illegal wickedness and might be
the Duty of some.
But not only does the fugitive slave bill contravene and oppose the
Purpose of the Constitution, it also transcends the Means which that
Power of Attorney declares the People's agents shall make use of, and
whereto it absolutely restricts them. The Constitution prescribes that
"the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior courts the Congress may ordain and establish." "The Judges
... shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall ...
receive a compensation which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office." Now the Commissioner who kidnaps a man and
declares him a slave, exercises _judicial power_. Commissioner Loring
himself confesses it, in his Remonstrance against being removed from
the office of Judge of Probate. You are to consider whether a
Commissioner appointed by the Judge of the Court as a ministerial
officer to take "bail and affidavits," and paid twice as much for
stealing a victim as for setting free a man, is either such a
"supreme" or such an "inferior court" as the Constitution vests the
"judicial powers" in. If not, then the fugitive slave bill is
unconstitutional because it does not use the Means which the People's
Power of Attorney points out. Of course the inquiry stops at this
point, and you return "not guilty."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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