The Trial of Theodore Parker: For the "Misdemeanor" of a Speech in Faneuil Hall against Kidnapping, before the Circuit Court of the United States, at Boston, April 3, 1855, with the DefenceParker, Theodore
Religion
The Trial of Theodore Parker: For the "Misdemeanor" of a Speech in Faneuil Hall against Kidnapping, before the Circuit Court of the United States, at Boston, April 3, 1855, with the Defence
Parker, Theodore
Antislavery movements -- Massachusetts -- Boston; United States -- Fugitive slave law (1850)
(1.) Was Commissioner Loring, who issued the warrant to kidnap Mr.
Burns, legally qualified to do that act. Gentlemen, there is no record
of his appointment and qualification by the form of an oath. No
evidence has been adduced to this point. Mr. Loring says he was duly
appointed and qualified. There is no written line, no other word of
mouth to prove it.
(2.) Admitting that Mr. Loring had the legal authority to command Mr.
Freeman to steal Mr. Burns, it appears that stealing was done
feloniously. The Marshal's guard seized him on the charge of
Burglary--a false charge. You are to consider whether Mr. Freeman had
legally taken possession of his victim.
(3.) If satisfied thus far, you are to inquire if he held him legally.
It seems he was imprisoned in a public building of Massachusetts,
which was by him used as a jail for the purpose of keeping a man
claimed as a fugitive slave, contrary to the express words of a
regular and constitutional statute of Massachusetts.
If you find that Mr. Freeman was not in the lawful discharge of his
duties as Marshal, then the inquiry stops here, and you return a
verdict of "not guilty."
But if you are convinced that an obstruction was made against a
Marshal in the peace of the United States, and in the legal discharge
of a legal, constitutional duty, then you settle the question of Fact
against me, and proceed to the next point.
II. _The Question of Law._
1. Is there a law of the United States punishing this deed of mine?
The answer will depend partly on the kind of opposition or obstruction
which I made. If you find (1.) that I obstructed him, while in the
legal discharge of his legal duties, with physical force, violence,
then there is a law, clear and unmistakable, forbidding and punishing
that offence. But if you find (2.) that I obstructed him with only
metaphysical force,--"words," "thoughts," "feelings," "wishes,"
"consent," "assent," "evincing an express liking," "or approbation,"
then it may be doubtful to you whether the law of 1790, or any other
law of the United States forbids that.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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