On the 26th and 27th the enemy continued to mount guns and push forward their works, but there was no general action. Smirnoff and Kondratenko were much exercised about our lack of heavy guns, and, through the agency of Prince Mackalinsky (naval officer attached to the Fortress Staff), arranged for the fleet to supply some. This officer was of the utmost use to us as an intermediary between the Fortress Staff and the Navy; for the Navy as a rule wanted many reasons before they would assist us. On the night of the 26th we discovered that the enemy had abandoned Nos. 1 and 2 Redoubts, which were full of corpses; but on the night of the 27th these were again occupied by them. At 2 a.m. in the morning of the 28th there was an alarm of a general attack, but it turned out to be an attack on 203 Metre Hill, Long Hill, and Fort No. 4 only. The 28th passed fairly quietly, with unimportant gun-fire, as did the 29th. On the night of the 29th our communications behind the main line were heavily shelled. During the preceding three days the gendarmes buried 700 Japanese dead in front of our north-east positions. This was done under fire. In the evening of the 29th the enemy entrenched near Water Supply Redoubt, and we temporarily recaptured part of No. 2 Redoubt by a sortie. That evening, Prince Mickeladsey informed me that he was sending a post to St. Petersburg, and that I could send a telegram. He added: 'But don't talk of it, for if it is known, ---- will at once hear of it.' I wrote out two identical telegrams--one to a relative in St. Petersburg, and one to a friend: 'Arthur is enabled to hold out only by the efforts of Smirnoff and his excellent assistant Kondratenko.... When I can give you details your hair will stand on end. Tell the Tsar this, for it is absolutely necessary that ---- should be removed.'